However, in a moment of visionary genius (or institutional irony), Xerox created one of history’s most influential research centers. In 1970, they established the in California. PARC’s mission was to explore the "architecture of information."
The revolution arrived in 1959 with the . It was the first fully automatic plain-paper copier. You could place any document on a glass plate, press a button, and receive a clean, dry copy on ordinary, untreated paper. It was a miracle of industrial design and chemistry. The 914 was enormous, weighed 650 pounds, and had a notorious tendency to catch fire (requiring an included "scorch eliminator" – a fire extinguisher). Yet it was an instant phenomenon. Haloid, having renamed itself Xerox Corporation in 1961, created an entirely new industry. The verb "to xerox" entered the global lexicon, a testament to its dominance. II. The Golden Age and the Innovation Paradox (1970s) With a near-monopoly on copiers (protected by over 500 patents), Xerox became a cash colossus. Revenue soared from $40 million in 1960 to over $1 billion in 1968. But success bred complacency in the core business. The leadership, focused on selling and leasing copiers, famously failed to see that the future was not about better copies, but about digital information.
Xerox executives from the East Coast, whose entire business model was selling large, centralized copiers, could not comprehend the value of small, networked, personal devices. When Steve Jobs of Apple visited PARC in 1979 in exchange for allowing Xerox to invest $1 million in Apple (a deal that would net Xerox over $100 million), he saw the future. He famously remarked, "Why aren’t you doing anything with this? This is the greatest thing." Xerox let the GUI and mouse slip away. Apple released the Lisa (1983) and Macintosh (1984). Microsoft later copied the concept for Windows. Xerox’s own attempt to commercialize the Alto, the Xerox Star (8010) in 1981, was technologically brilliant but priced at $16,000+ per workstation, a commercial failure.
Under (1999-2000), Xerox’s first outsider CEO (ex-IBM), the company attempted a drastic restructuring. It failed miserably. Sales incentives collapsed, channel conflict erupted, and morale cratered. Thoman was fired after 13 months.
However, this pivot left the original hardware business weakened. The rise of the "paperless office" – ironically enabled by the scanning and digital workflow technologies Xerox had helped create – steadily eroded the demand for printing and copying.
Haloid spent years refining Carlson’s invention. The key challenge was finding a better light-sensitive material; the solution was , which could hold an electrostatic charge and dissipate it when exposed to light. To brand this new process, Haloid coined the term "xerography" – from the Greek words xeros (dry) and graphein (writing). In 1949, they launched the first crude xerographic copier, Model A , but it was manual and messy.
Yet the strategic damage was permanent. Xerox had been forced to retreat from the low-end market. It remained a strong player in high-volume "production" printing and services, but it was no longer the invincible giant. The 1990s saw a series of CEOs try to redefine Xerox for the digital age. Paul Allaire (CEO 1990-1999) pushed the company into document management software and services, renaming the company The Document Company (tagline: "The Document Company – Xerox"). But the transition was painful. The core copier business was mature, and new digital initiatives were slow to profit.
Then came the crisis. By late 2000, Xerox was hemorrhaging money. Its business model of leasing copiers (long-term revenue) required huge upfront capital. When sales slowed, it ran out of cash. Debt was downgraded to "junk" status. The stock price plummeted from $60 to under $4. There were serious doubts Xerox would survive.